Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry

Appendices

Documents of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories*
The Greek Occupation of Izmir and Adjoining Territories

Document 1

Covering letter Sent to the President of the Peace Conference.

CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 October 1919.

Please find enclosed the dossier containing all the documents relating to the inquiry conducted in Asia Minor in execution of your decision of 22 July 1919.

In addition to the minutes of meetings and their annexes, which include the witness statements in extenso, the dossier contains, in accordance with the instructions set out in your telegram of 26 July:

1. An account of the events that took place following the occupation.

This account sets out, in chronological order wherever possible, all the facts that we believe influenced events, and particularly those referred to in the complaint lodged with the Peace Conference by the Sheikh-ul-Islam.

The report drawn up by the Colonel appointed by the Greek Government to monitor the work of the Commission is annexed to this account.

The Colonel received a copy of the account of the established facts, but in accordance with your instructions of 22 and 26 July, we did not send him the chapter on responsibility or our findings.

As we stated in our reply to your decision of 30 September, which was sent to you on 3 October by the French High Commissioner in the east, we have been unable, whilst continuing to honour our commitments, to send the Greek representative the witness statements, which are confidential.

2. A chapter determining responsibility;

3. The Commission’s findings.

These findings were adopted unanimously.

The Members of the Commission:

R.H.HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL’OLIO, MARK BRISTOL.

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16 In the original, this document was preceded by a table of contents enumerating the documents contained in this appendix.

18 See Vol.1, No. 17, minute 12.

19 Not included in file copy of this appendix.

20 Document 3 below.

21 Document 6 below.

22 Document 5 below.
The Commission of Inquiry was created following a complaint lodged with the Peace Conference by the Sheikh-ul-Islam on 15 July. It was comprised of the following Members:

**For America:** Commodore Bristol;
**For France:** Brigadier Bunoust;
**For England:** Brigadier Hars [Hare];
**For Italy:** Lieutenant-General Dall’Olio.

Lieutenant Luigi Villari was appointed Secretary-general. The following officers were also attached to the Commission:

**For the United States of America:** Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart (later replaced by Lieutenant Jones) and Mr. Caessbrough (Turkish interpreter);

**For France:** Lieutenant Rumerch–ne, Sub-Lieutenant Vitalis (Greek interpreter) and Sub-Lieutenant Dugoureq;

**For the British Empire:** Major Thomson (Turkish interpreter), Captain Harris and Lieutenant Higham (during the Commission’s stay in Asia Minor).

**For Italy:** Lieutenant Villain and Lieutenant de Bosis.

The Commission met for the first time at the Italian Embassy in Constantinople on 12 August. On this occasion, it was unanimously decided that each member would take it in turns to act as President of the Commission, and that if the Commission met twice in one day, that the same Commissioner would act as President for both, and that each meeting in Constantinople would be held in the embassy of the State to which the President belonged.

Six meetings were held in Constantinople, the last on 19 August. The Commission then relocated to Smyrna, where it met for the first time on 23 August in the Sultanieh School, offered for its use by the Ottoman authorities. It held 12 meetings in Smyrna, the last (the 18th) meeting being on 5 September.

On 6 September, the Commission transferred to Aydin, where it remained until 12 September. Three meetings took place in Aydin itself; on 10 September it moved to Girova, in the Italian zone, to hear the statements of Turkish refugees from Aydin; it met
on 11 September in Mazli [Nazili] in the zone occupied by the forces of the Turkish national movement, where it interrogated refugees, including Greek refugees, also from Aydin.

On 12 September, the Commission returned to Smyrna, where it met another nine times; four other meetings were held respectively in Odemisch, Menemen, Magnesios and Ayvalik. The last meeting in Smyrna (the 35th) was held on 26 September. The Commission, after hearing the witnesses, with the exception of those who were in Constantinople, returned to the town, where it met for the 36th time on 1 October. Another 11 meetings were held there, the last one being on 15 October.

In all, it met 46 times.

175 witnesses from a range of nationalities and social backgrounds gave evidence.

The dossier was comprised as follows:

At each meeting, the witness statements, the deliberations of the Commission and, in the most important cases, its discussions, were recorded. An abridged version of the minutes, listing the matters discussed or decided and the names of the witnesses interrogated, was attached, in addition to letters, reports and other documents specifically relating to the meeting in question.

The other documents were put together in a special dossier.

The Commission’s final report consists of three sections:

a) The established facts, which form a chronological account of the events with which the Commission is concerned;

b) An account of the responsibilities which, in the Commission’s opinion, can be identified from the established facts, and

c) The findings and recommendations that the Commission deemed useful to put forward in order to resolve any national difficulties.

The secretary-general,
LIEUTENANT LUIGI VILLARI.
Document 3

1. Account of Events that took place following the Occupation, which were established during the Inquiry between 12 August and 6 October 1919.

CONSTANTINOPE, 7 October 1919.

No 1. – Since the armistice, Christians have not been in danger in the Turkish province of Aydin.

The Greek population was unquestionably persecuted in 1914 and during the war, and treated unkindly in the months immediately after the armistice by the Vali Noureddin pacha. However, since the rise to power of the current Vali Izzet Bey, all the inhabitants, regardless of race, have been treated impartially.

Despite the presence of several gangs of brigands in the region, we can confirm that peace has been restored.

Fears of Christian massacres were unjustified. Investigations have shown that attempts to rally Muslims to a Greek massacre, which came to the attention of the Greek authorities a few weeks before the landing and which were forwarded to Athens, were not written by officers in the Turkish constabulary, whose signatures appeared on these documents. These documents are undoubtedly forgeries.

No 2. – Security in the vilayet of Aydin, and in Smyrna in particular, in no way justified the occupation of Smyrna’s forts by application of Article 7 of the armistice (See the reservations expressed on this subject by the Italian General Representative in the minutes from the 37th meeting).

Furthermore, the situation in the vilayet did not justify the landing of allied troops in Smyrna.

On the contrary, the situation worsened after the Greek landing due to the state of war existing between the Greek troops and Turkish irregulars.

No 3. – Smyrna’s forts were occupied on 14 May 1919 by the British, French, Italian and Greek Allied Forces, acting on the orders of Admiral Calthorpe of Her Majesty’s Royal Navy, one of the Allied High Commissioners based in Turkey for the purpose of executing the terms of the armistice. The order for the occupation stated that this was in execution of Article 7 of the armistice between Turkey and the allied Powers.

23 Article 7 of the Armistice of Port Mudros provided that: “The Allies have the aight to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the

No 4. - During the night of 14 May and early hours of 15 May, several thousand Turks were called to the Turkish quarter near the Jewish cemetery. This gathering was not aimed however at organising resistance to the Greek landing by force, but at demonstrating the might and predominance of the Turkish inhabitants.

No 5. - The Peace Conference ordered the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops. These orders were issued by Admiral Caithorpe on behalf of the Conference. The town of Smyrna was occupied on 15 May 1919 by Greek forces, assisted by the American, British, French, Greek and Italian navies.

The British, French, Italian and American navies landed small armed contingents to protect their respective consulates.

The Greek navy landed a group to protect the landing points of the Greek troops. This group had insufficient force to preserve order and carry out its mission.

The Greek forces were comprised of three regiments. The landing took place on the headland and on the quay in front of the Hotel Kramer. The troops began landing at 8 o’clock in the morning.

No 6. - No resistance to the landing was organised by the Turkish authorities. Gunshots fired by Turks were isolated incidents.

No 7. - Several hundred prisoners from different backgrounds escaped from prisons near the barracks a few hours before the occupation.

The Turkish authorities did not take effective steps to guard against or stop these escapes.

Some of the prisoners were able to procure weapons from the arsenal near the barracks.

No 8. - The Greek High Command took no preventive measures to maintain order whilst the Greek troops marched through the town. It had only placed detachments of Greek sailors in the immediate vicinity of the two points chosen for the landing. In accordance with the orders of the representative of the Entente, the Turkish troops stayed in their barracks.

No mechanisms were in place to enable the Greek Command to communicate its orders to the Turkish authorities, or to obtain information on the state of mind of the population.

No 9. - The Greek, military, civil and religious authorities did nothing to appease the crowd.

The ceremony conducted by the Metropolite to bless the troops on their landing only served to add fuel to the fire.

The behaviour of the crowd, gathered along the route taken by the troops, incensed the Turkish inhabitants and led to acts of violence being committed by zealous individuals.

No 10. – The landing orders were not executed to the letter. They were modified without the approval of the Command, following the intervention of the captain of the Averoff, which had been warned that groups of Turks were amassing near Carantina.

The Companies of Evzones, which were to land at Carantina to occupy the hills above the town to the south, were taken to the customs pier, where they disembarked behind other regimental units. The guidelines that had been issued for the various itineraries to be followed were observed by their commanders, who were oblivious to the fact that the Turkish troops were confined to their barracks near the Konak.

No 11. – The first gunshots were fired near the corner of the Konak square, at the entrance to the street leading to Cocarialy.

It is impossible to ascertain who fired these first gunshots. The Greek troops did not open fire and only returned fire following these first gunshots.

No 12. – Intense gunfire followed these first gunshots. The Greek soldiers, who found themselves in the Konak square gardens, fired violently on the shutters of the barracks and the Konak.

It has been impossible to ascertain whether gunshots were fired from some of the windows of the barracks after the gunfire broke out.

No traces of bullets could be found in the walls of the buildings facing the barracks.

A few gunshots also seem to have been fired by Turks at certain points along the quays and in the town, in particular near the Greek consulate, where, according to Greek reports, the guard was forced to defend itself against a Turkish attack by firing gunshots.

No 13. – Along the route taken from the Konak square to the ship Patris, where they were imprisoned, the first convoys of prisoners comprised of officers and soldiers, as well as the Vali and civil servants, were tormented by the crowd which accompanied them and even by some of the Greek soldiers escorting them.

All the prisoners were robbed. They all had to shout ‘Zito Venizelos’, and walk with their hands raised. Some were massacred.

Apart from one or two exceptions, the Greek officers did not attempt to stop the acts of violence of their men.

No 14. – On 15 May, and for several days thereafter, the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested some 2500 people, including children under the age of 14. Staff
Some of the schools were even imprisoned on the Patris. Many of the prisoners were mistreated, robbed and detained for several days in unacceptable conditions.

No 15.--- On 15 and 16 May, countless acts of violence and looting targeted at the Turkish people and their homes took place in the town. Fezzes were stolen, preventing the Turks from leaving their homes. Many women were raped. Some people were murdered. The acts of violence and looting were committed for the most part by a mob of Greeks from the town, although it has been proven that soldiers also joined in and that the military authorities took no effective measures to stop the acts of violence and looting until it was too late.

No 16.---Conflicting reports have been given by the Turkish and Greek authorities as to the number of those killed and wounded on the day of the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops. Approximate numbers are as follows:

Greeks: soldiers: 2 killed, 6 wounded; civilians: 20 killed, 20 drowned, 60 wounded.

Turks: 300 to 400 victims (killed or wounded).

No 17.---After news of the landing of Greek forces in Smyrna spread to surrounding villages, the Greek inhabitants began to loot Turkish homes and steal Turkish livestock. Some Turks were also killed in the various villages.

No 18.---On 21 May, the Colonel in charge of the Greek occupying troops received a telegram sent from Paris the day before by Mr. Venizelos, who determined the conditions of occupation in the sanjak of Smyrna and in the kaza of Ayvalik, as well as in certain regions located outside the sanjak of Smyrna.

No 19.---It was not until 1 June that Commodore FitzMaurice, appointed representative of the Entente on 28 May, received instructions informing him of his attributions vis-à-vis the Greek authorities with regard to the extension of the occupied zone.

Following the departure of Admiral Calthorpe (21 May) and until 28 May, the representative of the Entente was the French Vice-Admiral Sagoy du Vauroux.

No 20.---The Greek High Commissioner, who arrived in Smyrna on 21 May, acted against the orders contained in the telegram of 20 May by authorising the Colonel in charge of the troops to issue orders for the following on 23 May:

a) The occupation of Aydin;

b) Intervention in the regions of Magnesios and Kassaba, without having first requested authorisation from the representative of the Entente.

The Greek High Commissioner has acknowledged his responsibility in this matter before the Commission.
No 21. - To justify the extension of the Greek zone, the Greek High Commissioner relied on:

a) Uncorroborated information received by the military authority, according to which law and order was under threat in the aforementioned regions;

b) An interpretation given by the military authority of conversations that took place with the English Colonel Smith, who was not qualified to replace the representative of the Entente.

Colonel Smith was unaware of the telegram sent to Colonel Zafiriou on 20 May by Mr. Venizelos. At no time did he authorise Colonel Zafiriou, even verbally, to go to the Aydin-Magnesios region and Kassaba. He merely pointed out to Colonel Zafiriou the advantage of sending troops along the railway to Trianda to protect the track, provided that Colonel Zafiriou had the authorisation to advance his troops.

Colonel Smith added that extending the occupied territory beyond Trianda could lead to chaos.

He reported this conversation to his commanding officer.

No 22. - The advance and installation of the Greek troops in the direction of Magnesios and Eudemich and Aydin and as far as Nazili initially took place under satisfactory conditions, despite the national feeling aroused by news of events in Smyrna. The Greek Command erred in tolerating the action of armed Greek civilians, who, under the pretext of assisting the Greek troops, began looting and committing all manner of excesses.

On 15 August, a court martial set up in Smyrna on 16 May by the Greek Command pronounced 74 convictions, including three death penalties for the events of 15 and 16 May alone. Those convicted included 48 Greeks, 13 Turks, 12 Armenians and one Jew.

No 23. - The tension created in the country by the events in Smyrna gradually increased for the following reasons:

a) The subject of the size of the territory to be occupied by Greek forces was governed by uncertainty until 2 June, when Commodore FitzMaurice from the British navy was appointed to determine the limits of the occupation.

b) The rapid advance of Greek troops into the country increased the agitation of the population. Turkish nobles began to evacuate the occupied region. Turkish regulars and the constabulary deserted. Greek civilians openly carried weapons. The activity of brigands increased, as did the number of acts of violence, theft and looting.

c) Searches for weapons conducted by Greek troops in Turkish homes, in which
They were assisted by armed civilians, aggravated the discontent of the population since the searches violated the Muslim custom of the sanctity of the home and was viewed as harassment.

Throughout the vilayet of AYN [Ayd–nlj, this tension led to apparent chaos, which tended to justify the extension of the zone occupied by Greek troops.

No 24. – The weapons carried by Greek civilians were probably obtained after the armistice from the contraband operating between the islands and coast.

It is pointless to dwell on the accusation made by the Turks against the Greek Red Cross that weapons contained in Red Cross boxes were landed in Smyrna.

All that has been proven is that in February a large number of boxes were unloaded from the Greek ship Adriaticos on several occasions and that these boxes eluded customs inspections. Turkish witnesses who gave evidence claimed that some of these boxes contained weapons and ammunition.

It was not until the beginning of March that the Greek authorities authorised the inspection of the boxes by Turkish customs officials.

No 25. – Ayassoulouk, Deuneadjid and Baladjik were all occupied on 25 May. Aydin was occupied on 27 May, Eudemich was occupied on 1 June and Nazili was occupied on 3 June.

No 26. – A number of raids on Greek positions by Turkish gangs or rebels led to Greek reprisals, some of which could be justified on military grounds. All of these reprisals were brutal, murders were committed.

No 27. – Nazili was evacuated during the night of 19 June and early hours of 20 June at the instigation of the commander of the occupying battalion. This evacuation was not executed in accordance with the orders of the representative of the Entente, issued on 14 June, according to which the Turkish local authorities were to be forewarned of the departure of the Greek troops.

No 28. – The Greek military authorities explained that the battalion commander feared an attack, and that so that the enemy would not learn of its retreat, did not inform the Turkish authorities of its departure. The orders to evacuate Nazili were not given by the High Command until 19 June.

No 29. – Once the Greek troops had left, the Turkish authorities did not have time to create a police contingent which would replace the constabulary, disarmed during the Greek occupation and in a state of disorder. They were thus unable to prevent looting and the massacre of several Greek families by Turkish gangs, who entered Nazili a few hours after the Greek evacuation.
No 30. – The thirty or so inhabitants arrested in Nazili by the Greeks as suspects were taken away with the retreating troops.
   One of them was killed en route under the pretext that he could not walk.
   Some of the others managed to escape, but most were killed during fighting that broke out in the village of Kiosk, during which a Greek officer was also killed.

No 31. – After the Greek troops evacuated Nazili, Turkish attacks on Greek positions and individual soldiers increased.
   Throughout the Aydin region the population was armed, Turks as well as Greeks.

No 32. – The Greek troops carried out armed reconnaissance patrols around Aydin. In the course of these reconnaissance patrols, some of the villages were burned down.
   On 27 June, one of these reconnaissance patrols was repulsed by the gangs, which pursued it as far as the outskirts of Aydin. The fighting continued the following day. On 28 June, the attackers began to use 105-mm guns.
   The Greeks retreated.
   The Greek Commander and Greek witnesses assert that Turkish inhabitants fired on retreating Greek troops as they were crossing the Turkish quarter south of the railway track. Some of the fires that broke out in the Turkish quarter in the morning of 29 June started during this engagement.
   Other fires also broke out in this quarter at various isolated points.
   A large number of Turkish men, women and children who were trying to leave the burning quarter were killed for no reason by the Greek soldiers, who were guarding all the exits that led from this quarter to the northern part of the town.
   There is no doubt that the Greek Command and troops ran amok.
   The Greeks evacuated the town in the night of 29 June and early hours of 30 June after having committed numerous attacks and other crimes. A large number of Greek civilians hoping to escape by accompanying the troops as they retreated were prevented from doing so by the Command.

No 33. – The fire in the Greek quarter was started by Turkish gangs under their leader Yuruk Au. The gangs entered the quarter in the morning of 30 June and burnt it down after having looted the houses, killing the occupants.
   Irrespective of age or sex, a number of Greek inhabitants encountered by the gangs as they roamed through the town were ruthlessly killed.
   Around 2000 or 3000 inhabitants were robbed but not killed. They had managed
to take refuge in the French convent before the gangs arrived, after which they sought
the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division, in the
Konak.

Similarly, several notables also managed to get to the Konak. Some escaped death,
but others were executed.

It has not been possible to ascertain the total number of Greek or Turkish victims.

The representative of the Greek Government, who gave evidence before the
Commission on 7 September, estimated the number of Greek victims to be in the region of
2000. Some 900 bodies had already been recovered by that time. An English witness put
this number at about 400.

A French officer conducting an on-the-spot investigation several days after the
events took place put the number of victims at:

1500 to 2000 Greeks;
1200 to 1500 Turks;

The French officer did however acknowledge that estimating the number of Turkish
victims was a very difficult task.

No 34. – The Greek troops, with the help of reinforcements sent by General Nider,
recaptured Aydin on 4 July. They set fire to the Turkish quarter situated in the western part
of the town, where there were also some Greek factories.

No 35. – All the fires that were started between 29 June and 4 July most probably
destroyed two thirds of the town of Aydin, which had a population of 20,000, including
some 8000 Greeks.

Any houses that were not burned down were looted.

No 36. – Before the Greeks returned to Aydin, most of the Turkish population had
already left the town and surrounding area in order to take refuge in the Italian zone or in
the Nazili-Denizli region, where it remains today.

About a thousand or so Greeks were taken into the Turkish zone, where they were
still living in hardship at the time of the Commission’s visit to Nazili on 11 September.

No 37. – The reoccupation of Aydin was ordered by the Greek High Command in
spite of the express orders of the representative—of the Entente.

The Greek authorities acted on express orders received from Mr Venizelos in Paris
on 2 July. The orders prevented the representative of the Entente from intervening in the
matter.
and Aydin were destroyed by fires started in the course of the military operations that took place in the region.

No 39. — At present, peace has all but been restored, with the exception of the zone in the immediate vicinity of the front, where out-post engagements are still taking place leading to losses and requiring military measures which affect local inhabitants.

A similar situation exists in the Eudemich region, where the Greek occupation has taken place.

No 40. — The occupation of the vilayet of Aydin by the Greek forces has caused significant material losses to crops and property.

Some of the losses have been attributed to looting, theft and the destruction of livestock, although it is impossible to evaluate the exact extent of these losses. Some of the livestock was used for food by the Greek troops.

Other less significant losses were caused by military operations and skirmishes between the Greek forces and Turkish gangs.

Finally, considerable losses were suffered due to the burning of houses, villages and the town of Aydin. Losses resulting from the burning of Aydin are valued at approximately eight million pounds sterling.

When the Turkish inhabitants abandoned their houses and fled from the districts occupied by the Greeks, they also abandoned their crops, leaving them unharvested. The losses in terms of beans, liquorice roots and figs can be estimated at one million two hundred thousand pounds.

The olive crop will also suffer if conditions have not improved by November.

No 41. — Pergamos was occupied on 12 June. As this town is in the north of the sanjak of Smyrna, the Greeks were entitled to occupy it in accordance with the orders of the Entente given in the telegram of 20 May.

The Commission did not visit Pergamos.

From information gathered from reliable sources, it has emerged that Turkish irregulars who recaptured Pergamos killed the Turkish inhabitants who co-operated with the Greeks. They also massacred and often tortured all the Greek soldiers taken prisoner in the course of the Pergamos affair.

No 42.— On 17 June, following the evacuation of Pergamos, Greek troops which had gathered at Menemen launched an unwarranted and veritable massacre of defenceless Turks. The municipal authorities assert that more than 1000 Turkish inhabitants were killed, although this number would appear to be an exaggeration. An investigation carried out the following day by a French officer ascertained that 200 Turks had been killed and 200 wounded.
The massacre was not organised by the Greek Command. It resulted from panic on the part of tired young soldiers with little experience of war who were still suffering the effects of events in Pergamos. The officers, however, had done little to subdue their men.

No 43. – The Greek military command asserts that the Greek repression followed an attack by Turks who fired on Greek soldiers from a house near the railway station and from the Konak.

Numerous witnesses have given evidence on this subject. Evidence given by Greek witnesses is imprecise and sometimes contradictory.

It is the Commission’s belief that the assertions of the Greek Command cannot be regarded as accurate.

No 44. – The occupation of Magnesios, outside the sanjak of Smyrna, took place on 25 May without the authorisation of the representative of the Entente and without this Supreme Authority being informed.

For military reasons, the occupation was extended and maintained as far as Ahmedli to the east and Papazli to the north-east. Greek troops even occupied Akhisar briefly, but did not stay here.

At first, the occupation of the Magnesios zone was not beset with problems. Relations between the population and the Greek troops became strained following the ill-treatment of some of the inhabitants, the damage and theft suffered by some of the properties and the searches made for weapons.

Apart from the Muftat, the Turkish civil authorities remained in Magnesios. The Muftat was summoned to Smyrna by the Greek authorities but fled to Constantinople. At present, the situation is untroubled. The General in charge of the occupying division and the Turkish authorities enjoy a good relationship.

No 45. – After the armistice, gangs of Greeks from Mytilene made a number of incursions into the area around Ayvalik, robbing and killing several Muslims. Reprisals were carried out by some of the Turks in the region. Yet despite these acts of reciprocal banditry, the situation remained normal and satisfactory.

In the first few days of the occupation of Ayvalik, the military authority enlisted and armed demobilised soldiers and Greek civilians. The demobilised soldiers and Greek civilians acted deplorably and were accused of having set fire to two villages. They were disarmed and disbanded shortly afterwards.

Ayvalik currently has a relatively small Turkish population of around twenty Muslims.
The peace is unbroken in the country, but trade has come to a virtual standstill. No 46. — Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks do not appear to have returned to their homes. This may be due to mistrust of the Greeks or because Turkish irregulars are preventing them from returning on political grounds. The number of refugees is very considerable indeed, although the Commission has been unable to ascertain the exact figure.

In certain areas, such as the Meander valley, entire villages have had to be abandoned, even if they were not destroyed by fire.

No 47.— On the subject of the transporting of Greeks to the province of Smyrna, referred to in the complaint lodged by the Sheikh-ul-Islam Moustafa-Sabir with the Peace Conference,” the inquiry has shown that:

a) According to the telegram sent on 7/20 May by Mr Venizelos, the occupation was partly intended to enable refugees living in Greece to be repatriated to the sanjak of Smyrna and the kaza of Ayvalik;

b) Greek refugees have settled in some regions, particularly around Pergamos and Phocea. This phenomenon has been facilitated by the exodus of the Turkish population from these areas;

c) Faced with the disturbances that accompanied the occupation, the Greek authorities issued orders to halt mass repatriation. Only certain wealthy families whose means of support were known have been allowed to return.

Other refugees most probably succeeded in returning by landing away from the Greek-controlled ports, but their number can hardly be great. The accusation made by Sheikh-ul-Islam is therefore not entirely justified.

The Members of the Commission of Inquiry

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CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 October 1919.

We are writing to acknowledge receipt of your report of 11 October 1919 which we had requested in our letter of 7 October. Our request was intended to allow the Peace Conference, after having studied the account of the facts established by the Commission, to examine any comments that reading this document may have prompted you to make.

Your report will be added to the dossier on the inquiry next to the account to which it relates.

The various documents which you sent to the Commission during the inquiry and to which you allude in your report will also be added to the dossier.

The Commission has taken into account the comments made by you in paragraph no 14 concerning the occupation of Ayvalik, and has modified the wording of paragraph no 45 of its account. We attach an amended copy to this letter.

You will not be surprised to learn, since you were informed of this during the meeting of 13 October, that the opinion of the Commission on certain points does not accord with your own, in spite of the witness statements that you have produced.

In fact, not only do individual assessments of a given fact differ, but, faced with an excessive number of contradictions in the testimonies of Greek and Turkish witnesses, the Commission has on occasion been obliged to attach special importance to testimonies or reports by persons not belonging to the nations directly affected by the settlement of the Smyrna question in order to establish the truth.

To sum up, after much deliberation, the Commission has deemed that, with the exception of the alteration to be made to the wording of paragraph no 45, there are no grounds for modifying its original account, which was adopted unanimously.

R. B. HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL’OLIO, MARK BRISTOL
Document 5

Appendix II. Comments\textsuperscript{26} made by Colonel Alexander Mazarakis on the account of the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry.

1. It is asserted in paragraph no 1 that after the armistice, Christians in the vilayet of Aydin were not in danger. Yet the Commission admits that not only was the Greek population unquestionably persecuted after 1914 and during the war, but that Greeks were treated unkindly in the first few months following the armistice. The Commission also acknowledges the existence of gangs of brigands, but asserts that fears of massacres were unfounded.

With all due respect, I am convinced that a study of the history and recent fate of the Christian population in Turkey would undermine this assertion. All of the massacres and acts of persecution, which on many occasions elicited European intervention, were unforeseen and hence any intervention always arrived too late, after the acts had been committed. Let me remind the Commission that a list of the murders, acts of banditry and persecution of all kinds committed by the Turks after the armistice and prior to the occupation of Smyrna has already been submitted to it, and that much of the Greek population found itself exiled in Greece during this period, where it remains today, having abandoned all of its land occupied by the Turks, whilst another section of the population returned from central Asia Minor, where it had been transported, reduced to one half or one third of its former number, in extreme poverty and pitiful health, deprived of all means of settling and providing a livelihood for itself. I regret that under these circumstances I am unable to share the Commission’s opinion that peace had been restored and that fears of a resurgence of Muslim extremism were unfounded, especially on the eve of the decisions of the Conference, which naturally could and were bound to arouse such extremism.

2. The Commission considers (paragraph no 2) that the occupation of the forts and the town of Smyrna was not justified by application of the armistice. It is not for me to enumerate the reasons why the Peace Conference ordered this occupation and why it specified that this occupation should be carried out by Greek troops. However, I venture to observe that the execution of the occupation was illusory, that weapons

\textsuperscript{26} Note in the original: ‘This report was accompanied by the following covering letter:
Constantinople, 29th [September]/12th October 1919.
Dear Chairman, I have pleasure in submitting to the Commission some comments suggested by the account of the results of the inquiry that you kindly sent me. Yours etc.,
Colonel Alexander Mazarakis
theoretically kept in the armouries were, as events have shown, in the hands of the Turks, that irregulars, tolerated if not encouraged by the Turkish authorities, were armed with heavy artillery, that without this occupation, the Greek refugees would have been unable to return, repossess their seized properties or resume work, and finally, that without wishing to examine the intentions of the Conference as regards the future of this region, which should nevertheless have had a say in the decision, the choice of the army of occupation was sufficiently justified by the fact that the region had been densely populated by Greeks for centuries. Indeed, before 1914, there were 495,174 Greeks and 219,583 Turks living in the sanjak of Smyrna and the kaza of Ayvalik alone. If this population declined during the war as a result of persecution, famine and murder, this was surely an added incentive for the victorious Entente to take adequate steps to protect it. I therefore believe that the occupation was not only justified, but also more essential than any other occupation carried out by the victorious Allies on the grounds of justice, political ethics and ethnography.

3. The Commission notes that since the Greek landing, the situation has been one of unrest due to the state of war. I would kindly ask the Commission to make the distinction, as it does in several of the paragraphs that follow, that in the zone occupied by the Greek army, law and order were restored in the first few days, whereas unrest and even anarchy reigned in the neighbouring unoccupied regions, and that the situation would be remedied if a decisive approach were adopted, if the Greek authorities were able to carry out their functions, if the Turks were not encouraged in their displays of national fervour by external attacks and by hopes of influencing Conference decisions and if the Turks were aware that the army of occupation sent by the Conference would respect their rights but not passively tolerate attacks on its security or dignity. The history of occupations both past and present, a history that is much longer and more turbulent, is proof that no army has ever been placed in such a situation and demonstrated more sangfroid, restraint and discipline. It would be unjust therefore to hold it responsible for a few isolated incidents, incidents that are encountered in peacetime and in the most civilised countries.

4. The Commission notes (paragraph no 4) that several thousand Turks gathered on the eve of the occupation, but does not believe that the purpose of this was to organise resistance by force to the Greek landing. It also notes (paragraph no 7) that several hundred prisoners from all backgrounds escaped from prison several hours before the occupation, that the Turkish authorities took no effective steps to guard against or stop these escapes, that some of these prisoners procured weapons from the arsenal, and finally, that gunshots fired by the Turks (paragraph no 6) were isolated incidents.

With all due respect, I cannot share the Commission’s conviction that the Turks
gathered for peaceful purposes in view of the inflammatory proclamations made in the mosques, in the press and in public squares, and in view of the release and arming of the prisoners. Nor do I agree that in actual fact it does not matter from the point of view of responsibility whether the shots fired on the Greek army were the product of an organised revolt or the initiative of a few individuals. The Greek army, marching by ranks of four in a column and with their weapons unloaded, was unable to make this distinction, once it found itself unexpectedly attacked. It was thus obliged to crush the rebellion brutally, arresting those whom it knew or suspected to be involved. Any other army would have acted similarly in such a position.

Regretfully, I must also point out that whilst the gathering of Turks is viewed with indulgence, any religious ceremony and expression of natural sentiment by the Greek population are deemed (paragraph no 9) to be of a kind likely to anger the Turkish inhabitants and lead to acts of violence. Nevertheless, the underlying cause for the rise in Turkish extremism is naturally found in the mere presence of the conquering enemy, the despised Christian. It is difficult however to avoid arousing such feeling without leaving the Christian population under the yoke of the conquered enemy, an enemy that over a period spanning five centuries caused them so much suffering. Their feelings are at least as worthy of consideration as those of their oppressor.

Wherever allied troops have, following a victory, occupied a country hitherto under the yoke of the enemy, their fellow creatures have welcomed them with genuine joy. In my report, I openly expressed the previously unheard view that the Greek Command should have had the foresight to act with more circumspection. Yet this does not represent grounds for attributing the Turkish attack to the expression of Greek sentiments, when so far it has been undisputed that the Turks fired the first shots before any hostile act towards them had been reported.

I must also point out (paragraph no 9) that there were no Greek civil authorities in existence, and that the military authorities, occupied for several hours with stamping out resistance, were unable to take immediate action to instil order in a large town with such a mixed population, and which the Turkish constabulary had left to its own devices.

I must also remind you that we are not dealing here with a few intermittent gunshots fired by the Turks, but with heavy gunfire, not only around the Konak and barracks, but along the entire length of the route to be taken by the troops in order to reach the Carantina ridge.

5. The Commission notes (paragraph no 14) that on 15 May and in the days that followed the Greek troops arbitrarily arrested around 2500 people. In a country where the army of occupation is attacked and where everyone is armed, I do not see how order could have been restored without criminals or suspected criminals being arrested by the
military authorities. The procedure for carrying out arrests in peacetime is impolitic in a state of war. Once order had been restored, a Commission, of which the Muftat was a member, visited the prisoners and most of them were released.

Although there were reports that the prisoners had been robbed and mistreated, and that looting had taken place in the town on the first day, the military authority took immediate action to stop these acts. In fact, the clampdown was so severe that order had virtually been restored the following day.

With all due respect however, I believe that many of the crimes, particularly the reports of rape, were fallacious. During my stay in Smyrna, it was found following thorough investigation that several of these complaints had been made by women of dubious morality. Moreover, I do not understand why the Greek authorities were not notified sooner of these acts, so deplored by the Turks, particularly since the Greek authorities dealt severely with the few against whom a case could be proven. I regret that I cannot give credence to the claims of witnesses who knew that they would not be contradicted, since these accusations were made in secret.

6. As regards the number of Turkish victims in Smyrna (paragraph no 16), Aydin or elsewhere, there was scope for the most fantastic estimates, especially since a large number of the Turkish inhabitants who fled from the occupied zone could easily be cited as being among those who had ‘disappeared’ at the hands of the Greeks.

7. As for the tension created in the vilayet of Aydin (paragraph no 23), I venture to think that this will soon subside, provided that the Turkish population realises that a firm decision by the Conference will determine the future of the region once and for all. This is proven by the fact that for almost a month, the entire region (Magnesios, Eudemich, Aydin and Nazili) has been occupied under satisfactory conditions, as the Commission itself is aware. In addition, 150 zeibek, hitherto outlawed in the mountains, reported to the Greek military authorities and, after promising to live peaceably, were allowed to go free. In almost all the occupied towns, the Muslim population has cooperated with the Greek troops. I completely concur therefore with the Commission that the uncertainty reigning over the question of the size of the territory to be occupied by the Greek forces contributed to and aggravated the tension. I must add that this uncertainty has persisted for five months now. I am convinced that the Turkish unrest will miraculously disperse when the Conference reaches a final decision, when any attempt to influence this decision through unrest would be rendered fruitless and when the Greek army is free to defend the area entrusted to it. In my opinion, the false situation in which the Greek army found and continues to find itself is the principal, if not the sole cause of the Turkish agitation. Moreover, in spite of any complaints that may have been made, we have sufficient proof that the Turkish inhabitants who left the region would
now be only too happy to return in the belief that they will be left in peace. They are only prevented from doing so by the gangs. Nevertheless, several Turks have managed to elude detection by the gangs and return home, particularly in the Pergamos and Magnesios regions.

The Commission partly attributes (paragraph no 23) the tension in the country to searches made for weapons. These searches are among the most legitimate and logical steps taken by an army of occupation in a country where the Turkish population is armed, and where almost all the armouries have been looted. Yet apart from isolated cases where the military authority found itself obliged to enter houses where gunshots had been fired, or where it believed weapons to be hidden, the Command and the High Commissioner were so insistent that these searches should not be carried out that the entire Turkish population, particularly in Aydin, is now armed. Furthermore, Colonel Skinas, standing accused before the court martial for not having taken steps to prevent the sad events that occurred in the town, cited in his defence the express orders given to him not to search Turkish homes. The Turks were aware of this, which is why all the proclamations made by the military authorities to the effect that the inhabitants were to surrender their weapons went unheeded. We are certain that the entire Turkish population remains armed to this day.

I would therefore ask the Commission, when it notes that Greek civilians, who lived in terror for five years, carried weapons, to recognise that the Turkish population was just as well armed, especially in the light of the fact that almost all the armouries were looted in spite of the terms of the armistice.

8. The Commission is prepared to acknowledge that the accusation made by the Turks that the Greek Red Cross used its boxes to conceal weapons should not be pursued. However, it notes that boxes were unloaded in February and that a number of Turkish witnesses assert that these contained weapons. It is all too easy to make unfounded accusations. The Greek Red Cross was under no obligation to submit its boxes of equipment for inspection by the Turkish authorities; if it did so spontaneously, it was to put a stop to the libellous reports in the Turkish press. I have already explained to the Commission that these boxes contained clothing for refugees and that the Director showed them to Turkish officials in the hospital and even to the public prosecutor. In passing, I would point out that these officials together with the Turkish population flocked to the hospital for treatment and drugs, and that the Vali himself went there on Easter Day. The Turks repaid the great service which this institution rendered to the population, regardless of race or religion, and which is proven by the statistics submitted to you, not only in Smyrna but throughout the country, with this slander and with the murder of Dr Manolas, Director of the Red Cross in Makri. Under these conditions, I
would ask the Commission to judge whether it is right to accept an unfounded accusation even in passing.

9. The Commission notes (paragraph no 29) that in Nazili, after the Greek battalion had withdrawn, the Turks massacred Greek families and looted the houses, and it attributes these acts to a lack of organisation and time on the part of the Turkish authorities. It is my belief, after the experience in Pergamos, where the Kaimakam and Turkish officers were in charge of massacres, and Aydin, where the Divisional Commander was in the town when the mass slaughter took place, that in reality there is no distinction between Turkish authorities and irregulars. It is also strange that Turkish reports contained in the press acknowledge that brigands were responsible for the situation in Nazili.

I would also ask the Commission to note that massacres took place in the surrounding villages as well as in the town of Nazili, that 47 Greeks were killed and the priest burned alive in Aktchd, that 47 people were killed in Kiosk, including a doctor and the priest, who was first blinded and had his nose and ears cut off, that three were killed and seven wounded in Sultan Hissar, that more than 90 Greeks were killed in Omurlu, and that 70 bodies were found after the reoccupation.

10. In its report of events in Aydin, the Commission admits (page 6, paragraph no 32) that a large number of Turkish men, women and children who were trying to leave the burning quarter were killed for no reason by Greek soldiers, who evacuated the town in the night of 29 June and early hours of 30 June after having carried out numerous attacks and committed other crimes.

I can only express my surprise at such an assertion. I have studied the numerous inquiries into these events and in which Muslims, Armenians and other groups made statements. I have personally conducted a thorough investigation, questioning all the military personnel and civilians who were there whether such acts were in fact committed. The conclusion I have drawn from all of this is that the Turks, whether irregulars or inhabitants of the town, fired on the army, that the army returned fire and that naturally there were victims on both sides in this fighting, which lasted for almost two days. I therefore cannot legitimately give credence to witness statements which presented the events in this light. I also wonder how it could have been possible to calculate the number of Turkish victims, in view of the fact that virtually the entire Turkish population, aware of its complicity, followed the irregulars before the town was reoccupied.

Nor can I agree that the Greek survivors were at the Konak under the protection of Colonel Cheffik Bey, Commander of the 57th Ottoman Division. On the contrary, I believe that this officer, who entered Aydin with the gangs, is equally responsible for the
acts of cruelty which were committed, not least because it transpired that several Greek notables were taken from the Konak and executed without the protection of that superior officer having any impact.

The underlying cause of the unfortunate events in Aydin can be found in the narrow-mindedness with which the Command executed its orders not to go any further south than the town, an order that it interpreted as denying it of the most basic safety measures that were necessary for the protection of the troops, and not to disarm the population, which enabled the Turkish inhabitants to join with the irregulars in attacking the troops. Although they were poorly executed, these orders, which demonstrate the loyalty of the Greek Command and the advantage the enemy derived from it, are worthy of the Commission’s attention.

11. The Commission notes (paragraph no 40) that the occupation of the vilayet of Aydin by the Greek forces led to considerable material losses. I venture to consider that these losses, most of which were suffered by the Greeks, particularly in Aydin, were not due to the Greek occupation, which in the space of a month caused virtually no material losses, but to the actions of Turkish irregulars, who were the aggressors at Pergamos, Nazili and Aydin.

12. The Commission considers (paragraphs no 42 and 43) the assertions of Greek witnesses whereby gunshots were fired by Turks in Menemen on Greek soldiers, leading to disturbances in the town, to be inaccurate. Yet the inquiry into events held the next day by the military judge Mr. Papageorges and by the former Muslim Prefect of Drama Mr. NaYb Zad– Bey, the inquiry held by Captain Apostolakis and the statements of more than 20 witnesses whom I personally questioned are unanimous and concur on this subject, particularly with regard to the murder of a Greek corporal, the gunshots fired from the Hassan Azap house and the Konak and the number of victims, which was put at 40.

I am not in a position to know the reasons why the Commission reached this conclusion, reasons that have a bearing on the importance and veracity of the witnesses who gave evidence, and can therefore only note this difference, which might not have existed if the procedure had been that proposed by the Greek Government from the outset.

13. The Commission notes (paragraph no 44) that the occupation of the Magnesios zone was not beset by problems and that relations between the Turkish population and the Greek troops subsequently became strained following mistreatment, searches etc.

Regretfully I must protest against the repeated accusations levelled exclusively at
the army of occupation following complaints made by Turks. At the very beginning, I gave the Commission a long list which mentioned 115 Greeks who had suffered at the hands of Turkish gangs in the Magnesios region. The same report also described the mass slaughter of Greeks at Yorktchekioy, Papazli, Yakakiyo, etc.

Since it has thought it advisable to recount the complaints made by Turks, I would also ask the Commission to record in its report the massacres of Greeks in that region, whose lives are every bit as important as the damage mentioned. Without this information, the account gives the reader a false impression.

I do not know if the Commission during its visit to Magnesios was aware that several Turkish inhabitants had managed to elude detection by the gangs and return home. This proves more than any statement or complaint made for political ends the confidence of the Muslim population in the justice and order reigning in the occupied zone, in contrast with the anarchy and pressure from gangs in the unoccupied zone.

14. The Commission makes an assessment of the sentiments of half of the Greek population of Ayvali (page 4, paragraph no 45) which surprised me greatly. I do not understand how the Commission can claim to be aware of the sentiments of the Greek population of Ayvali, since in the few hours it spent there it did not have time to hear a single one of the many inhabitants who were waiting to be called, military and religious authorities excepted, and a list of whom I have submitted to the Commission. Even if this assessment was supplied by someone, I do not believe that it should be presented as a categorical observation of the Commission itself if it has not been substantiated by a more in-depth and general consultation of the people.

If the Commission had paused to consider the secular sufferings of the Greek race in Asia Minor and the war of extermination that it has endured over the last five years, which have reinforced rather than weakened its national sentiment, it would surely have refrained from making this assessment, which could deeply wound the national sentiment of the Greek people and against which I protest in the strongest and most categorical terms.

The Turkish refugees who left the territories occupied by the Greeks (paragraph no 46) were prevented from returning home by irregulars, or rather by the Turkish organisation that is known to be part of the Turkish Government. The political aim is clear: to influence the Conference with regard to the political future of this part of the Ottoman Empire in a period of indecision and expectation.

The fact that several Turks have returned home, particularly in the Pergamos and Magnesios regions, is proof of the confidence which the Greek administration has managed to inspire, despite the numerous obstacles it has had to face, such as the
presence of the Turkish authorities, which take their orders from the Ottoman Government, the inability to act freely in the various branches of administration as a result of the hybrid situation in the country and the continuous preoccupation with the security of the zone, which is threatened by external gangs, etc. It is my firm belief, based on a careful examination of recent history in the Near East and on an in-depth study of the character of the Turkish people, that we should know better than anyone, having lived alongside them for centuries, that if the people could see that the Conference had reached a decision, then apart from a few professional agitators or exploiters, they would stay or return home, happy to be able to live in peace at last and escape from such an ill-fated, oppressive and backward government indifferent to both Turks and Christians.

16 [sic]. On the subject of the transporting of Greeks into the province of Smyrna, raised by the complaint made by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (paragraph no 47), I profess that I have not had sight of this document and therefore am not entirely familiar with the facts on which this complaint is based. I should point out however that it is not a question of ‘transporting Greeks’, but of repatriating Greeks who are native to Asia Minor and who were expelled by the Turks in 1914.

This repatriation, which is as logical as it is legitimate, should naturally preoccupy the Greek Government, which has expended considerable sums in support of them for years.

I have supplied the Commission with correspondence exchanged on this subject between the Greek Commissariat in Smyrna, from when this was first set up, and the authorities of the Kingdom, from where it has emerged that strict orders were issued and executed in order to prevent this repatriation.

Personally, I find that this measure, intended to prevent difficulties arising, in view of the fact that the properties of evicted Greeks had been seized and occupied by Turks, and to prevent friction between the Greeks and Turks, was too harsh. From the point of view of absolute justice, I wonder who has more rights, the owner who has been evicted and who wishes to return home, or the person who occupies it arbitrarily? How would a court rule in such a case? This has not been evaluated from a political point of view, since not only do Turks base their complaints on this, but they take advantage of it to claim and try to persuade the entire world that Turks are predominant in the region. They may even be believed by those visiting the country who see Greek villages, the former inhabitants of which are still in exile or who have perished in central Asia Minor, now inhabited by Turks.

17. Alongside the established facts contained in its account, I would ask the Commission to be so good as to recount the numerous murders of Greeks by Turks, not
only in those places where the Commission conducted its inquiry, but also in regions where the Greek
army never set foot and where, as a result, responsibility for events is clear-cut. 47 murders were
reported in Philadeiphios and neighbouring areas, 110-115 to the south of the Meander, 14 in Makri
etc. These are referred to, together with names and dates, in the documents that I submitted to the
Commission on the first day.

To summarise if I may:

1. The military occupation was imposed to restore order, to rescue what remained of the
   Christian population, which was persecuted, exiled and massacred for five years, and to prevent a
   resurgence of Turkish extremism;

2. All the events which had regrettable consequences took place after Turks had attacked the
   Greek army;

3. Not only did the Greek authorities act promptly throughout to restore order, but I even
   venture to suggest that they treated and continue to treat the Muslim population favourably;

4. Even the lack of foresight on the part of the Greek Command in Smyrna can be explained
to a certain extent in view of the fact that neither Greece’s representative nor the representatives of
the Entente in Smyrna expected the Turks to attack, and thus took no effective measure to move the
Turkish troops and prevent the people from gathering and going about their business;

5. Perfect order reigns in the zone occupied by the Greek army, whilst there is complete anarchy
outside this zone.

COLONEL ALEXANDER MAZARAKIS,
Delegate of the Greek Government
CONSTANTINOPLE, 11 October 1919.
Document 6

II. Establishment of Responsibilities

CONSTANTINOPLE, 11 October 1919.

No 1. — The inquiry has proven that the general situation of Christians in the vilayet of Aydin has been satisfactory since the armistice and that they have not been in danger.

Although the Peace Conference gave the order to occupy Smyrna on the basis of inaccurate information, initial responsibility for events lies with the individuals or governments who established or passed on the uncorroborated information, such as that referred to in paragraph no 1 of the established items. (On this subject the Italian General Representative expresses once more the reservations contained in the minutes of the 37th meeting).

No 2. — The primary cause of events stems from religious hatred, demonstrations of which the Greeks did nothing to prevent. Far from seeming to be the execution of a civilising mission, their occupation immediately assumed the appearance of a conquest and crusade.

No 3. — Responsibility for events which took place in Smyrna on 15 and 16 May and in the immediate vicinity of the town in the first few days following the landing lies with the Greek High Command and with certain officers who failed in their duty.

The Greek Government has acknowledged this responsibility by the sanctions it has taken.

Some of the responsibility does however lie with the Turkish authorities in Smyrna, who took no steps to prevent common law prisoners from escaping and taking up arms before the Greeks arrived.

No 4. — In the person of the civil Supreme Authority representing it in Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the serious disturbances which bathed the country in blood while the Greek troops advanced because:

a) The said authority did not comply with the instructions of the Supreme Council contained in Mr Venizelos’ telegram of 7/20 May. Without requesting any authorisation from the representative of the Entente, it allowed the military Command to give the order on 10/23 May to send troops to Aydin-Magnesios and Kassaba outside the limits of the sanjak of Smyrna;

b) The same authority deliberately left the population in ignorance of the extent of the occupation, thus helping to increase the tension of the Muslim inhabitants and contributing to the ensuing chaos.
No 5. – The supreme Greek authorities are held responsible because they allowed armed civilians to move about the country.
They even tolerated the involvement of some of these armed civilians alongside regular troops in some of their military and policing operations.

No 6. – The primary cause of the disturbances that occurred in the Meander valley was the occupation itself, for which there was no justification.
The regrettable events that accompanied the advance and installation of the Greek troops were due to the state of war in which the country found itself on the arrival of the troops.
The centuries-old hatred between Turks and Greeks undoubtedly increased the frequency and savagery of these acts.
In all justice, the Greeks should not be held solely responsible for these acts.
The same considerations apply to the events that took place in the Pergamos region and around Magnesios and Eudemich.

No 7. – On the contrary, the Greeks are solely responsible for the Menemen massacre. This massacre was not premeditated, but the Greek Command knew that the troops were tense following the Pergamos affair and could and should have taken steps to control the troops, whom, out of nervousness, fatigue and fear carried out a veritable massacre of defenceless Turkish civilians without provocation.
The Greek officers who were present at Menemen utterly failed in their duty.

No 8. – Although the situation has now improved, calm has not yet been restored in the vilayet of Aydin.
Virtually all trade with central Anatolia has ceased.
This situation is undoubtedly the result of the occupation and the state of war which still exists between the Turkish irregulars and Greek troops, even though the latter are no longer extending the zone of occupation.
The leaders of the Turkish national movement, who are acting in concert with former leaders of the gangs of brigands, still do not have sufficient authority over their forces to prevent them from carrying out the occasional incursion. Consequently, they can be held partly responsible for the current situation in the country.
Yet underlying the responsibility attributed to the leaders of the Turkish national movement is that of the Turkish Government, which until now has had no authority over the leaders of the national movement.

The Members of the Commission:
MARK BRISTOL, BUNOUST, A. DALL’OLIO, R. H. HARE.
General Dall’Olio reports as follows:

The Commission of Inquiry should examine the events that accompanied and followed the occupation by Greek troops of the regions of Smyrna, Aydin and Ayvali, which are set out in particular in Sheikh-ul-Islam’s protest addressed to the Paris Conference. Consequently, and since these instructions are supported by the specification that the period under examination is between the Greek occupation and 26 or 29 July, I am of the opinion that the reasons for the landing and the occupation of the forts should not be discussed. This question is not within the Commission of Inquiry’s remit but within that of the Conference, and for this reason I believe it to be my duty to maintain my point of view, and I would urge my colleagues to be good enough to accept the reasons I am offering on this subject.

In any event, I would ask that this declaration, which is generally one of reservation, to be included in the minutes.
III. Conclusions put forward by the Commission

CONSTANTINOPLE, 13 October 1919.

I. The situation which has arisen in Smyrna and in the vilayet of Aydin following the Greek occupation is false because:

a) The occupation, the purpose of which in principle was only to maintain order, actually has all the appearances of an annexation. The only effective authority is in the hands of the Greek High Commissioner. The Turkish authorities which have remained in office no longer have any real power. They no longer receive orders from Constantinople, and in view of the near complete disappearance of the Turkish police and constabulary no longer have the means necessary to execute their decisions;

b) The occupation is imposing considerable military sacrifice on Greece, a sacrifice which is out of proportion with the mission to be carried out if this mission is a temporary one and intended only to maintain order;

c) In its present form, it is incompatible with the restoration of order and peace, of which the population, threatened by famine, are in dire need.

II. It is the Commission’s view:

a) That if the sole purpose of the military occupation of the country is to maintain law and order, the occupation should be entrusted not to Greek but to Allied troops, under the authority of the Allied Supreme Command in Asia Minor;

b) That occupation by the Greeks alone should only continue if the Peace Conference is resolved to pronounce the complete and definitive annexation of the country to Greece. In this case, the Greek Command should be allowed freedom of action with respect to the Turkish forces;

c) that annexation pure and simple as envisaged above would be contrary to the principle which proclaims respect for nationalities, since in the occupied region, outside the town of Smyrna itself and Ayvali, the Turkish population undoubtedly predominates over the Greek population.

It is the Commission’s duty to point out that Turkish national sentiment, which has already demonstrated its resistance, will not accept this annexation. It will give in only to force, that is, in the face of a military expedition which Greece alone could not conduct with any likelihood of success.